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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this Feature is to critically examine and to contribute to the burgeoning multi 
disciplinary literature on markets as complex adaptive systems (CAS). Three economists, 
Robert Axtell, Steven Durlauf and Arthur Robson who have distinguished themselves as 
pioneers in different aspects of how the thesis of evolutionary complexity pertains to market 
environments have contributed to this special issue.  Axtell is concerned about the procedural 
aspects of attaining market equilibria in a decentralized setting and argues that principles on the 
complexity of feasible computation should rule in or out widely held models such as the 
Walrasian one.  Robson puts forward the hypothesis called the Red Queen principle, well 
known from evolutionary biology, as a possible explanation for the evolution of complexity 
itself.  Durlauf examines some of the claims that have been made in the name of complex 
systems theory to see whether these present testable hypothesis for economic models.  My 
overview aims to use the wider literature on complex systems to provide a conceptual 
framework within which to discuss the issues raised for Economics in the above contributions 
and elsewhere.  In particular, some assessment will be made on the extent to which modern 
complex systems theory and its application to markets as CAS constitutes a paradigm shift from 
more mainstream economic analysis. 
                                                          
1 I am grateful for discussions over the years with Ken Binmore, Steve Spear, Vela Velupillai and for an 
important meeting and email exchanges with Herbert Simon.  Bernhard von Stengel kindly gave detailed 
comments on Complexity of Exchange and  John Sutton has been very generous to me with his data that 
has been used in Section 3.  I’m grateful to Eliot Maenner  for improving the aesthetic quality of the paper 
tremendously.  Recent discussions with Thomas Lux, Jasmina Arifovic, Edward Tsang and the Feature 
contributors Robert Axtell, Steven Durlauf and Arthur Robson  have helped produce a coherent whole.  I 
particularly appreciate Steve Machin’s encouragement and patience in the process of bringing this 
Feature to fruition.       
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Few will contest that epi-phenomena of biological systems and socio- economic systems is 
anything but complex.  The purpose of this Feature is to critically examine and to contribute to 
the burgeoning multi disciplinary literature on markets as complex adaptive systems (CAS).  
The new sciences of complexity, the principles of self-organization and emergence along with 
the methods of evolutionary computation and artificially intelligent agent models have been 
developed in a multi-disciplinary fashion. The cognoscenti here view that complex systems 
whether natural or artificial, physical, biological or socio-economic can be characterized by a 
unifying set of principles.  Further, it is held that these principles mark a paradigm shift from 
earlier ways of viewing such phenomenon.  
Three economists, Robert Axtell, Steven Durlauf  and Arthur Robson who have 
distinguished themselves as pioneers in different aspects of how the thesis of evolutionary 
complexity pertains to market environments have contributed to the special issue.  Axtell is 
concerned about the procedural aspects of attaining market equilibria in a decentralized setting 
and argues that principles on the complexity of feasible computation should rule in or out 
widely held models such as the Walrasian one.  Robson puts forward the hypothesis called the 
Red Queen principle, well known from evolutionary biology, as a possible explanation for the 
evolution of complexity itself.  Durlauf examines some of the claims that have been made in the 
name of complex systems theory to see whether these present testable hypotheses for economic 
models.  My overview aims to use the wider literature on complex systems to provide a 
conceptual framework within which to discuss the issues raised for Economics in the above 
contributions and elsewhere.  In particular, some assessment will be made on the extent to 
which modern complex systems theory and its application to markets as CAS constitutes a 
paradigm shift from more mainstream economic analysis. 
  The earliest precursor to modern complex systems theory resides in the classical 18th. 
century political economy of the Scottish Enlightenment that order in market systems is 
spontaneous or emergent in that it is the result of ‘human action and not the execution of human 
design’.  This early observation, well known also from the Adam Smith metaphor of the 
invisible hand, premises a disjunction between system wide outcomes and the design 
capabilities of individuals at a micro level and the distinct absence of an external organizing 
force.  It has been claimed that not just market equilibria but many institutions and artifacts in 
society ranging from language to division of labour, civil society and monetary exchange are 
unintended consequences of individuals’ actions rather than those borne of rational calculation 
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and design.  This anti creationist classical thesis in Economics which marks the provenance of 
modern evolutionary thought is also supposed to have predated and influenced Darwin, 
Hodgson (1993). The paradigm change implied by the anti-creationist thesis in evolution, the so 
called contra “argument from design” pertains to the most remarkable of macroevolutionary 
trends viz. the emergence of new  forms within more complex organisms or systems.    
 Section 1 briefly reviews the multi disciplinary and computational legacy of CAS 
theory.  The  sine  qua non of a CAS will be found to be its capacity to produce novelty or 
‘surprises’ with a mathematically non-trivial definition for the non-anticipating global ordering 
pattern for the system with interacting constituent elements.  The latter achieved in the absence 
of central command is often referred to as self-organization or emergence of macroscopic 
properties of the system.  In Section 1.2, I will delineate some formal issues regarding the three 
major perspectives on self-organized complexity and these are not all mutually exclusive to the 
different sciences involved here, viz. Computer Science/Mathematics, Physics, Biology and 
Economics.  In all variants of complex systems theory it is held that macroscopic properties 
cannot be formally or analytically deduced from the properties of its parts.  Methodologically, it 
is precisely this that distinguishes the sciences of complex systems from the bulk of traditional 
science which relies on deductive formalistic and analytical methods.  However, as will be seen 
in Sections 3 and 4, different postulates exist on what are regarded to be the testable and 
observable aspects of CAS depending on whether or not the emergence of new forms or the 
capacity for variety is endogenous to the process of self-organization.   
It will be argued that it was not well into the 20 th. century with two epochal 
developments in the foundations of mathematics and advances in computer technology that 
definitive formulations of CAS are possible.  The first of this is the Gödel-Turing-Post2   results 
on incompleteness and algorithmically unsolvable problems where for the first time the logical 
impossibility limits to formalistic calculation or deductive methods were established.  In the 
absence of these limits on computability there is in principle no reason why creationism or a 
designing mind is not the force behind all observed patterns and new forms.  Indeed, without 
these foundational advances on computation and incompleteness or what Goldberg3 (1995) calls 
“a heavy dose of mechanism”, it is not possible to explain the necessity for the emergence of 
newly adapted forms which is considered to be the hallmark of CAS.   The three major natural 
exponents of CAS are evolutionary biology, immune systems and innovation based structure 
changing growth of capitalist systems dubbed creative destruction by Schumpeter (1950).  The 
                                                          
2 The seminal papers here are Gödel (1931), Turing (1936) and Post (1944). 
3 Goldberg  (1995) claims that the mystery shrouding innovation can be dispelled .. “by a heavy dose of 
mechanism.  Many of the difficulties in the social sciences comes from a lack of a computational theory 
of actor innovation …. .  population oriented systems are dominated by what economists call the law of 
unintended consequences (which is itself largely the result of the innovative capability of the actors )”, 
(Ibid. p.28). 
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second significant methodological development is the Holland-Bak-Arthur use of computer 
based artificial environments  to simulate dynamics from large numbers of interacting agents 
with varying levels of computational and adaptive intelligence to give material counterpart in 
virtual environments to the otherwise elusive phenomenon  of emergence and self-organization.  
Though many of these advances in the methodology of science have bypassed 
mainstream economics (see, Krugman, 1996), the contributions of some economists to CAS 
theory have been substantial.  The seminal work of Schelling (1978) is one of the earliest 
examples of the use of computer simulation to demonstrate how simple micro behavioural rules 
result in a self-organized macro outcome, an undesirable one of racial segregation,  which could 
not have been deduced from the initial rules.4  More recently, a number of economists and 
physicists have got involved in the new computational agent based modelling in economics and 
they have respectively been called ACEs (Adaptive Computational Economists, see Tesfatsion, 
1998) and econo-physicists.  
 A major part of self-organization in markets relies on learning rational expectations 
equilibria or fixed point mappings of strongly self- referential system wide properties.   Section 
2 briefly discusses the computational and complexity issues relating to price formation and 
market equilibria.  In Section 2.1, I examine Axtell’s intriguing conjecture, this issue, that 
decentralized arrangements of exchange are also ones that permit feasible real time polynomial 
complexity in price determination.  In Section 2.2 Arthur’s famous El Farol game (1994) with 
its contrarian structure is given to illustrate the fundamental problem of inductive inference in 
prices in pure speculative markets which militates against homogenous rational expectations.  
Section 3 outlines some recent seminal developments on the issues relating to the 
emergence of new forms and the growth of complexity.  Much of this discussion can be 
subsumed under the Red Queen principle on competitive coevolution that was first discussed in 
the Economics literature by Robson (2002) and in this Feature.  In Section 3.2 some economic 
examples of the Red Queen such as competitive product innovation, the Lucas (1972) postulates 
on regulatory arbitrage and on the strategic use of ‘surprises’ are given.  Section 3.3  highlights 
the significance of  oppositional structures or of ‘parasites’ in the emergence of new forms 
which becomes a means by which systems escape from entrapment at local optima to global 
optima.  The necessity of ‘parasites’ or hostile agents is shown to be pertinent both in 
experimental artificial environments as well as in the formal logic of Gödel (1931) who 
mechanizes the exit route that leads to innovation from a non-computable fixed point involving 
the contrarian player, the Liar. 
                                                          
4In Schelling’s racial segregation model, households move residence because of a weak preference for a 
neighbourhood that has at least one third of  those adjoining them to be of the same colour or race.  Over 
time this results in very segregated neighbourhoods though everyone is initially placed at random and 
nobody is particularly intolerant.    
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  Section 4 covers some ground on the relationship between  empirical economics in 
terms of  testable hypotheses of CAS theory.   In section 4.1, a brief overview of  Durlauf’s 
contribution shows that the two main traditional methods of theory validation with varying 
degrees of rigour - the historical or case study method and econometric analysis - have for the 
most part failed to give evidence that can be specifically adduced to CAS.  In other words, as 
other explanations can fit the bill or the power of econometric tests is weak, identification 
problems loom large.  The latter is true also for agent based models.  In sections 4.2 and 4.3, the 
Red Queen effects and a lack of structural invariance and failure of meta (econometric) models 
to identify strategically induced innovation based structural change are shown to be important 
additions to the so called stylized CAS facts to do with lock ins, path dependence,  network 
effects, non linearities from thresholds and self-referential calculations, power law distributions, 
long memory and fat tails.  This is followed by a brief concluding section.  
1. Modern Complex Systems Theory  
 
1.1 The Multi-Disciplinary and Computational Legacy 
Pioneering multi disciplinary work in this area, without being exhaustive, has included  that of 
computer scientists and mathematicians ((von Neumann  (1970), Wolfram (1984),  Penrose 
(1988), Holland (1975, 1992), Koza (1992) and Goldberg (1989)); physicists  (Nicolis and 
Prigogine (1977, 1989), Bak and Wiesenfeld(1988), Bak (1996),  Anderson et. al. (1988),  
Langton et. al.(1992));  biologists (Kauffman (1993), Green (1994));and economists (Chen and 
Day (1993),  Axelrod (1984, 1987), Dosi and Nelson (1994), Epstein and Axtell (1996), 
Krugman (1996), Arthur et. al. (1997), Albin (1998) and Velupillai (2000)).  A number of these 
have been associated with the Santa Fe Institute, USA.  
 It is the work of John von Neumannn in the 1940’s on self-reproducing machines as 
models for biological systems and self- organized complexity5 which provides a landmark 
transformation of dynamical systems theory based on motion, force and energy to the 
capabilities and constraints of information processors modelled as computing machines.  The 
von Neumann models based on cellular automata6 have laid the ground rules of modern 
complex systems theory regarding  -(i)  the use of large ensembles of micro level computational 
entities or automata following simple rules of local interaction and connectivity,  (ii) the 
capacity of these computational entities to self-reproduce and also to produce automata of 
greater complexity than themselves and  (iii) use of the  principles of  computing machines to 
explain diverse system wide or global dynamics.  
                                                          
5 Mirowski(2002) discusses how radical a shift this has been for the methodology of science and also 
from the perspective of von Neumann’s earlier work with Oscar Morgenstern on the Theory of Games 
and Economic Behaviour .   
6 Cellular automata were developed by von Neumann and Stanislav Ulam to represent biological systems 
and for the purpose of modelling biological self-reproduction.  
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The significance of the von Neumann computational legacy of CAS is that it covers all 
substrata, ranging from the bio-chemical to the artificial, in which effective procedures or 
computation reside.  By the Church-Turing thesis (see, Cutland 1980) the intuitive notion of 
effective procedures or an algorithm can be identified with the class of general recursive 
functions and represent finitely encodable programs implemented in a number of  equivalent 
ways referred to as automata or mechanism.  The best known among these idealizations of 
mechanism is the Turing machine and no mechanism can exceed the computational powers of 
Turing machines. Such a definition of mechanism or formalistic calculation is necessary before 
complexity measures of the disjunction between the microscopic elements of the system and 
their macroscopic properties can be ascertained and also on what constitutes an innovation or 
surprise in the system. Further, there are compelling reasons why the powerful agenda of 
Herbert Simon (1956, 1978) on the procedural lacunae of rationality to further our 
understanding of observable boundedly rational behaviour, should be securely based on modern 
computability theory on the limits and efficacy of effective procedures.      
In  keeping with (i) above, as observed by Arthur (1991), the units of modern adaptive 
models are “parametrized decision algorithms” or units whose behaviour is brought about by 
finitely encodeable algorithms.  Indeed, as noted by Langton (1992) physical dynamical systems 
“are bound by the same in principle limitations as computing devices” (ibid.p82).  These 
limitative results of computing devices are generically referred to as the halting problem.  
Church’s Theorem and in particular the Gödel (1931) First Incompleteness Theorem  show how  
Turing machines themselves can produce encoded objects  (viz. by mechanizing the exit route 
in Georg Cantor’s famous diagonal method )  that cannot be enumerated  by any machine.  Such 
objects are innovations in the system and technically do not belong to recursively or 
algorithmically enumerable sets on which Turing machines halt. With regard to this Mirowski 
(2002) has correctly asserted that mathematicians “finally have blazed the trail to a formalized 
logical theory of evolution ”(ibid. p.141).  In other words, dynamical system outcomes produced 
by algorithmic agents need not be computable and fail to be systematically identified by 
codifiable meta models.  This is referred to as undecidable dynamics.  Gödel’s Second 
Incompleteness Result shows that it is precisely when systems isomorphic to number theory are 
consistent that internal consistency, which is a strongly self-referential system wide property 
often regarded as the hallmark of rational order, cannot be established by an algorithmic 
decision procedure.  Gödel (1931) axiomatically derived the undecidable proposition, the 
encoding of which represents the diophantine equation which has no algorithmic solution.7  This 
class well known as Hilbert’s Tenth problem has the highest degree of algorithmic 
                                                          
7 Diophantine equations are polynomial equations with integer solutions. The irreducible nature of the 
computation here is that short of letting the system run its course there is no a priori systematic way to 
determine the solution to the problem.  
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unsolvability.  Penrose(1988) was amongst the first to identify so called non-computable 
patterns or tiling problems, that nevertheless emerge from the execution of simple rules, with 
the Gödel incompleteness result.  
Methods of search and inductive inference in non-computable domains of problems 
which defy algorithmic or deductive inference has progressed substantially with methods of 
evolutionary/adaptive computation such as artificial neural networks (ANN) (see, Hertz et. al. 
1991) and in the form of genetic algorithms (GA) and genetic programs (GP) pioneered, 
respectively, by John Holland  (1975) and John Koza (1992). The fundamental issue with search 
procedures for optimal solutions is that the domain of search of all possible procedures which 
are fully defined, viz the class of total recursive functions, is not recursively enumerable. This 
set which is uncountably infinite has no algorithmic decision procedure and hence trial and error 
outcomes of inductive search may be far from a global optimum.  Typically, algorithmically 
unsolvable problems fail to be categorical 8 in that they have no unique decision/solution 
procedure.  Instead, a multiplicity of heterogeneous decision rules have to be considered in 
parallel and distributed fashion.  This is the hallmark of methods of many natural and artificial 
evolutionary computation such as GAs , GPs and ANNs.  Holland (1975) pioneered the 
Darwin/Fisher principle for the selection of decision rules within the context of GAs.  A 
decision rule is selected to grow/replicate at a rate which is in proportion to its fitness relative to 
the average fitness of the fixed population of decision rules.  Hence, the term replicator 
dynamics has been given to this method of selection (see, Hofbauer and Sigmund,1998,  p.67) 
and is thought to best suit short term evolutionary dynamics with fixed number of types in the 
population.  Note that GAs and GPs can introduce novel decision rules by cross over and 
mutation operators.  In general, the problem of selection when global credit assignment 
mechanisms on individual performance are not in place or how selective processes evolve from 
local interactions falls under the major theme of self-organization in CAS.  The significant 
factors in the long run macro evolutionary trends, viz. endogenous enhancement of 
performance/fitness or enlarging choice domains by innovations, are increasingly being seen as 
intelligent strategic adaptive responses in coevolving multi species populations.  Artificial life 
multi agent simulations pioneered at the Santa Fe Institute and elsewhere aid in a deeper 
understanding of the nexus between the non-anticipating nature of global outcomes and 
individual agent programs or rationality.  
 Table 1 first developed in Markose (2002) and embellished  further here shows how 
the new evolutionary computational methods on inductive inference and emergent computation 
relate to the more traditional formalistic/deductive methods.  What must be noted from Table 1 
                                                          
8 At the turn of the last century, positive proof of categoricity along with completeness and consistency of 
formal systems, was stipulated as desirata of  formal systems by the mathematician David Hilbert.  Gödel 
(1931) overturned this as a logical impossibility.  
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is that the axiomatically proven impossibility results on computability  (Column II ) delineate 
the classes of problems that mathematically fail to be amenable to deductive methods and why 
evolutionary adaptive methods have to be resorted to.  Further, one may contrast the 
implications for Economics given at the bottom of Columns I, II and III of deducibility and 
incompleteness, respectively.  
It is a major premise of this overview that scant attention paid by economists to the 
epochal non-computability issues for their science has been a stumbling block to a deeper 
understanding of the relevance of evolutionary methods and the principles of self-organization 
given in Column III, Table 1.  Hayek (1952,1967,1982) was one of the first economists who 
explicitly espoused the Gödelian formalist incompleteness and impossibility limits on 
calculation which he referred to as the limits of constructivist reason.  This led Hayek to the 
necessity of evolutionary solutions with the abiding premise of his large ouvre of work being 
that market institutions which coevolved with human reason enable us to solve problems which 
are impossible to do so by direct rational calculation.  Using different formulations of the 
problem, Lewis (1987) and Spear (1989) seminally showed the generic non-computability of 
fixed point mappings that represent equilibria in markets.  Axtell’s contribution, this issue, and 
pioneering work  by Arifovic (1994)  on evolutionary learning of rational expectations and  
inductive methods for equilibrium selection (see, survey in Arifovic, 2001) arise because of 
non-computability issues or because of real time computational intractability of fixed point 
mappings.  Velupillai (2000) derived the diophantine complexity class of parallel distributed 
computing that arises in a game where cooperation and competitive innovation can arise. The 
non-computability of fixed points with contrarian players, the mainstay of Gödelian logic and 
that of the halting problem will also be shown to be pertinent to the very large area pioneered by 
Brian Arthur on the nature of self- organization in stock market environments.  As we will see, 
the Binmore (1987) use of the Gödelian logic and Turing machine agents in a game is shown by 
Markose(2001b, 2002, Section 3) to be of  fundamental importance in resolving one of 
mysteries surrounding CAS on the emergence of new forms.  Thus, while Velupillai (2000) 
succintly points out how problems of non-computability naturally reside close at hand for 
cognitive aspects of choice, following Binmore (1987) this overview underscores theoretical 
reasons that market agents can be assumed to have full computational capabilities of Turing 
machines and why in no small measure the non-computable environment that necessitates the 
inductive methods of Table 1 Column III are endogenously generated by the activity of such 
agents.  
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Table 1 
I . Formalist /Deductive 
Methods and Related 
Dynamical Systems 
 
#Axiomatic Proof Theory 
# Model Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
Formalistic Methods 
*Predicate and 
Propositional Calculus 
*Classical methods of 
optimization  
* Classical 
Probability and 
Econometric Models 
 
 
 
 
 
• Perfect competition; 
existence results in 
general equilibrium 
models and static 
Welfare analysis 
• Command  Economy 
• Eductive Game Theory 
• Evolutionary Game 
Theory and diffusion 
dynamics with no new 
forms 
• Lognormal Stock 
Market Models 
• Homogenous rational 
expectations 
• Uniqueness and 
homogeneity  with 
Type I (limit points),  
Type II (limit cycle) 
dynamics 
• Market Completeness 
 
 
 
 
II.The ‘New Logic’: 
Mathematics of 
Incompleteness 
#Gödel(1931): 
Self-reference, 
Undecidability and 
Incompleteness 
#Church-Turing-Post: 
Algorithmic Unsolvability; 
Halting Problems 
# Wolfram-Langton  
 Complexity class with Type 
IV Dynamics and phase 
transition: “life at the edge of 
chaos”. 
 
Computability Methods 
*Recursion Function/ 
Computability Theory 
*Algorithmic and Stochastic 
Complexity Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
• Hayek (1967, 1982) on the 
limits of constructivist 
reason;  Hayek 
(1952,1982) on cognitive 
incompleterness 
• Lewis (1985,1987) on 
algorithmic unsolvability 
of general equilibrium 
prices 
• Spear (1989) on the generic 
non-computability of  
Rational Expectations fixed 
points  
• Vellupillai ( 2002) on 
Diophantine complexity of 
strongly self-referential 
global encoding of parallel 
distributed computation 
• Binmore(1987)/Markose 
(2001b,2002 ) non-
computability of fixed 
points with contrarian 
agents and strategic 
necessity for innovation  
 
III.Inductive Methods and Self 
Organizing Dynamics  
#Theory of Emergence 
And Self-Organizing Complex 
Systems (Local interaction 
models with spatial topology  of 
networks: Models of self-
organization with endogenous 
production of adaptive novelty) 
#Non-computable Penrose tiling 
and pattern generation 
#Coevolving multi species and 
Red Queen Effects 
Methods of Adaptive 
Computing 
*Cellular Automata 
*Classifier Systems 
*Genetic Algorithms and 
Genetic Programs 
*Neural Networks 
*Numerical multi-agent  
simulations  
 
 
• Irregular innovation based 
structure changing dynamics 
in capitalist growth: Type IV 
undecidable dynamics 
• Stock market crashes and non 
Guassian asset returns with 
fat tails 
• Red Queen dynamics with 
rivalrous arms race in product 
innovation, regulatory 
arbitrage etc. 
• Critical heterogeneity 
• Information/technology 
diffusion  in  socio-economic 
network with path 
dependence, increasing 
returns to scale 
• Evolved norms and 
institutions for self-
organization: computational 
efficiency versus maladaptive 
entrainment 
• Market Incompleteness 
 
 
                 IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC MODELS 
 10
In the case of the choice problem, even a simple evaluation of the truth value of  “X or 
else Y ”type proposition which is necessary for categorization of objects of choice, involves 
calculations of the neuronal network that are non-linear, of over dimension three, along with the 
assignment of integer or rational valued weights as in the solution of a diophantine equation, 
Velupillai (2000).  As no uniform solution procedures exist for this, even the perfectly rational 
agent with full computational powers qua Turing machine will still arrive at  
a solution in an adaptive way using trial and error techniques. 9   As with the above cognitive 
problem of classification, solutions once learnt by trial and error may be retained and passed 
down in some hereditary process.   System wide adaptive shared operational schema can emerge 
and these can then be called upon habitually when certain if-then conditions are satisfied.  
Inductive inference or behaviour of this kind which requires no de novo solutions is instinctive, 
atrophied into skilful behaviour within an adaptive shared schema and may in the words of 
Gode and Sunder (1993) display zero intelligence.  Examples will be given below of this 
important aspect of adaptive learning of shared operational schema in self-organization 
especially in socio-economic systems. 
1.2 Perspectives on Self Organization 
 
1.2.1 Self-organization In Systems With Endogenous Production of Novelty 
Following  the von Neumann legacy that transformed the foundations of dynamics from energy 
and motion to information and computation, Wolfram (1984), in what is now called the 
Wolfram-Chomsky schema,  postulates that on varying the computational capabilities of agents, 
different system wide dynamics can be generated (see, Wolfram, 1984, Dawid, 1999, Foley, in 
Albin, 1988, pp.42-55, Markose, 2001a).  Finite automata  produce Type I dynamics with 
unique limit points or homogeneity; push down automata produce Type II dynamics with limit 
cycles; linear bounded automata generate Type III chaotic output trajectories with strange 
attractors.  The significance of this schema is that it postulates that  
only agents with the full powers of Turing machines capable of simulating other Turing 
machines, which Wolfram calls computational universality, can produce Type IV irregular 
innovation based structure changing dynamics associated with evolutionary biology and 
capitalist growth.10 However, what appears mysterious is why agents with the highest level of 
computational intelligence are necessary to produce innovative outcomes in Type IV dynamics.  
The legacy of von Neumann towards what Goldberg calls a “computational theory of actor 
innovation ”(see, footnote 3) makes a veritable break with traditional Darwinian tenet that the 
                                                          
9 In other words, the popular assumption that agents need to have some arbitrary bounds on their 
computational capacity to justify the adaptive methods of Table I Column II, may be a mistaken one. 
10 It is a matter of controversy as to what conditions produce computational universal agents.  While there 
is agreement that far fewer than the 29-state cellular automata that von Neumann first considered could 
lead to structures identifiable with a universal computer,  there is some doubt whether this is possible in 
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source of innovation or mutation in the system is random.  Section 3 will indicate that highly 
commonplace oppositional structures that proliferate in society and immune systems are the 
clue to understanding what agents, if they were Turing machines, would do. 
What is remarkable is that the formal character of equilibria of systems capable of the 
endogenous production of novelty based complex dynamics corresponds to the notion  of 
recursively inseparable sets first defined by Emil Post (1944) in the context of algorithmically 
undecidable decision problems.  It is in this context, that Casti (1994, pp. 143-149) makes the 
connection between complex undecidable dynamics and ‘surprises’.  Langton (1990, 1992) 
identifies the analog between the Wolfram-Chomsky complexity classes, the halting problem 
and the phenomenon of phase transitions and colourfully refers to the phase transition 
associated with Type IV dynamics as “life at the edge of chaos”.  The recursively inseparable 
sets are two disjoint sets.11 The one on which Turing machines halt is associated with Type I  
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the 2-state cellular automata that Wolfram has considered  (see, Bak, 1996, p.106-107)   The Langton 
(1990) experiments with a 5 state cellular automata which appears to give him Type IV dynamics.  
11 Technically, these disjoint sets are recursively enumerable but their complements are not.  If this were 
not to be the case, the system will be complete in that  no novel encoded objects (not already in these sets) 
can ever arise.  
diuu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Type I and Type II 
 Dynamics (Limit Points 
 Or Homogeneity and 
 Limit Cycles)   
 
Type III 
Chaotic 
Dynamics 
Fig.1 Set Theoretic Representation of Self-Organization With Endogenous 
Novelty 
Set on which 
Turing machines 
can be deduced 
not to halt 
 
 
Type IV 
Innovation 
Based 
Structure 
Changing 
Undecidable
Dynamics 
Set on 
which 
Turing 
machines do
not halt 
Set on 
Which 
Turing  
Machines 
halt  
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and Type II dynamical systems with limit points and limit cycles, which Langton calls 
(computable) order.  The other set on which Turing Machines can be logically deduced to be  
incapable of halting represents systems with Type III chaotic dynamics.  Both of these sets 
represent attractors for dynamical systems that cannot produce novelty.  The domain for novelty 
producing Type IV dynamics lies outside both these sets.   
Figure 1 gives the set theoretic representation of the Wolfram-Chomsky schema of the 
complexity classes for dynamical systems which formally corresponds to Post’s set theoretic 
proof of the Gödel Incompleteness Result (see, Cutland, 1980, Markose, 2001b).   
It is indeed the case that the necessity for self-organization  of a system capable of 
endogenous novelty production follows from this axiomatic proof on the impossibility of its 
algorithmic implementation.  No finite meta model can ever computably identify the novelty 
based change in the structure of this system.  As will be seen in Section  4, this has an 
empirically testable hypothesis well known to economists as the Lucas Critique (Lucas,1976) on 
the failure of econometric models to identify structural breaks that follow from strategically 
induced innovation. 
Langton (1990,1992) makes an important observation that systems capable of 
endogenous novelty generation experience a critical slowing down at the phase transition 
between the two other domains of (computable) order and chaos as the system at this juncture is 
effectively involved in an irreducible process of calculation  of an undecidable global ordering 
problem of Gödel’s Diophantine degree of complexity. An important aspect of the non-
recursive reordering or self-organization that is going on when innovations have to be 
incorporated into an extant system is that the logical consistency of the internal rules/programs 
governing the dynamical system must be satisfied at the phase transition. The big question 
addressed in the next section is whether Langton’s self- organized phase transition associated 
with Type IV complex dynamics can arise in systems that are incapable of endogenous novelty 
production and where innovations are exogenously introduced.   
 
1.2.2  On Self-Organized Criticality (SOC) With Exogenous Innovations: Connectivity and 
Networks 
Bak and his coworkers (Bak et. al. ( 1987), Bak and Sneppen  (1997)) have been very 
influential in associating some universal macroscopic properties, in particular, the statistical 
distribution of power laws in systems with large ensembles of micro interacting constituent 
parts.   Power laws have been observed in natural, artificial and social systems ranging from 
earth quakes, the size of cities and to income distribution.  The discovery by Pareto (1887) of 
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the power law exponent of 3/2 for wealth distribution12 which has stayed remarkably constant 
over two centuries for capitalist countries, is perhaps the most famous of such laws. 
 Bak postulates that power laws are the statistical consequence of systems that are 
capable of self-organization at critical points.  Bak (1997, p. 112) clearly would like  to identify  
his principle of self-organized criticality  precisely with systems that  have computational 
universality, viz. those capable of endogenous production of novelty.  In this framework, a sub 
critical system will converge to homogeneity and a supercritical system will manifest chaotic 
dynamics with critical behaviour lying between the two as laid out in Figure 1.  Despite, the 
precise mathematical characterization of Langton’s “life at the edge of chaos” as the critical 
phase transition associated with Type IV complex dynamics, the latter has unfortunately been 
the subject of much pastiche, invoked even in the case of systems without endogenous 
capabilities for generating novelty. 
             The nature of dynamics associated with self-organization is qualitatively well known as 
irregular ‘waves’ or avalanches’ observable from the process of  spontaneous reorganization in 
capitalist creative destruction and also from  records of mass extinctions in evolutionary 
biology.  The Bak hypothesis is that in SOC systems, the number of individuals involved in 
each wave of  birth/death type reorganization that follows from a  ‘mutation’ in the system will 
follow a power law.  This power law exponent should also be invariant across different scales of 
population size when the system is critical.      
The deficiency, however, with the computer simulation models that Bak and his 
coworkers have devised, the so called sandpile model and the Bak- Sneppen (1993) model on 
waves of evolutionary extinctions, is that the systems per se do not have any capacity to 
produce innovation endogenously.  In the simple version of the  Bak-Sneppen  (1993) model 
with species arranged on a one dimensional lattice, the least fit species (fmin), where fitness is a 
number between 0 and 1, is exogenously subjected to a random mutation and so are the two 
adjoining species with their new fitness levels being drawn from a uniform distribution .  This 
fixed dynamical rule when iterated a large number of times produces burst like avalanches.  A 
critical value, fc, in the limit is identified for the level of fitness in the population below which 
the probability distribution of fitness falls to zero and above it the distribution converges to a 
fixed value.13  
                                                          
12 The probability distribution (or the proportion of individuals in a population with wealth of size w) is  
given as P(w )  ∼ w-1-α  . Ηere,  α ∼3/2  is what is referred to as the power law exponent.  See, also 
Durlauf , this issue, for more economic examples.  
13 For any given level of fitness 0 < f* <1, an avalanche of duration T is defined as follows: for t < t’ < T,   
fmin(t) > f* ,  fmin (t’) < f *, fmin(T+1) > f *.   That is, the duration of the avalanche is the time T for which 
the species with the minimum fitness  fmin in the population starting from the point at which it exceeds the 
given level of fitness f *, falls below it and then recovers again.  Bak and Sneppen(1993) find that for fc, 
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The Ising model in statistical mechanics adopted and extended by Liggett (1985, 1997) 
is the fundamental prototype for the dynamics arising from large numbers of local interactions.  
However, Ligett (1985, 1997) makes no claims for self-organized criticality, Type IV 
dynamics, or for powers laws.  Further, for reasons that will be obvious, it will be useful to refer 
to Ligett criticality (to distinguish it from Bak SOC) as the point at which 
 systems tip in one direction or another.  Typically, in the Ligett/Ising framework the diffusion 
of a binary process is considered, such as infection or no infection in epidemics, to buy or sell in 
a herding model pertaining to markets, choice between two competing products etc.  It can be 
argued that in the absence of endogenous scope for novelty, there is little to mathematically 
differentiate between Bak criticality and Ligett criticality except the focus of analysis.   Thus, 
notwithstanding the controversy on whether  the agency of change can be assumed to be 
exogenous, as has been expertly summarized in Jensen (1998, p.126-127), the two necessary 
and if not sufficient conditions in such spontaneous reorganization with critical power law 
behaviour is interconnectivity in local rules of agents and the application of thresholds.  Further, 
some systems with large numbers of interacting elements may also have network effects which 
form positive non-linear feed back loops resulting in increasing returns to scale.      
The crucial insight here is on the connectivity of agents in networks and that criticality 
in systems may also be viewed as those displaying specific classes of patterns of connectivity or 
networks.  In graph theory nodes/vertices can be represented as agents and edges as connective 
links with a function (fixed or time varying) measuring the intensity or frequency of interaction 
between (i,j) agents.14  On the one extreme there are networks where every player can interact 
with any other (a zero dimensional one) or one where a player can interact with its nearest (k) 
neighbours.  The small world networks (Watts and Strogatz (1998), Watts (2002)) which are 
meant to be characteristic of socio economic networks, is one in which the fixed k- 
neighbourhood of an individual is modified by breaking a fraction of its k original links. An 
equal number of new links are created by adding to an individual’s neighbourhood a set of 
randomly selected individuals from the whole system.     
As with horses for courses, economic applications of local interacting agent models 
have taken two types of perspectives.  The first perspective favoured by econo physicists and 
some ACEs has gone down the Bak route with the focus on self organized criticality and power 
laws.  Here, the Lux and Marchesi (1999) stock market model with local level fixed non-
adaptive interactions producing fat tail global price dynamics has been influential.  In a recent 
application of the Bak-Sneppen type framework for the study of technological diffusion, Arenas 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the probability density function of the so called avalanches of different durations, has a power law 
distribution, P(T) ~ 1/T.     
14 Mathematically, Green (1994) has found that the many different representations of interconnectivities 
in systems  such as in matrix models (for example, Markov processes), dynamical systems involving 
differential equations and cellular automata are all isomorphic to directed graphs. 
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et. al. (2002) consider changes driven by cumulative social interactions spreading through social 
networks with the threshold cost of adoption being dependent on the degree of incompatibility 
with neighbours.  Agents are placed on a one dimensional lattice and an exogenous selection is 
made of agent to have his technological competence enhanced by a random amount in periods 
when diffusion waves have died out.  Arenas et. al. (2002) define a parameter k which reflects 
the relative incompatibility costs of  being either ahead of one’s neighbours or behind them.  
Each agent plays a myopic best response as in a coordination game with the important proviso 
that agent i’s game with i-1 is not independent of what he plays with i+1. They find that below a 
critical value for k, denoted by k*, the system shows complete homogeneity in technological 
competence used and at k* a critical degree of heterogeneity persists with power laws observed 
in the size of avalanches.  An avalanche is defined by the number of agents who revise their 
technological level upwards after a random update on the technology of one agent.  It must be 
noted that Arenas et. al (2002) do not show self-organization with k* being obtained by an 
endogenous process.  They give a series of simulations of the system dynamics with different 
values of k and report the critical k* as one for which the size of avalanches follows a power 
law with an identical exponent irrespective of scale of the population.   This is not satisfactory 
along with the pastiche on Langton’s characterization of Type IV dynamics for their system 
with no endogenous capabilities for innovation.  However, what is important to note is that the 
critical heterogeneity in adoption strategies that arises from the power law characterization of 
self-organizing systems is in sharp contrast with the bulk of extant evolutionary game theory 
models on coordination games.  Convergence to homogeneity of strategies in the latter appears 
to be the norm in contrast to the rich diversity observed in the real world. 
 A very large group of local interaction economic models (see, Durlauf and Young, 
2000) that comes under the rubric of social dynamics for the study of the diffusion of 
innovation, information or norms is based on the Liggett/Ising framework adapted for economic 
analysis by Blume (1993).  This framework treats local feedback effects as a stochastic process 
in which the probability that a given person adopts one of two possible actions, say A or B in a 
given period of time, is assumed to be an increasing function of the number of his neighbours 
who have adopted it.15 There is also an idiosyncratic factor that reflects agents’ preference for A 
or B irrespective of other agents.  Many of these models assume a fixed network structure 
                                                          
15 A well known formulation of this in the stock market context, Sornette ( 2003),  is for an investor, i, to  
do what the majority of his neighbours did in the last period (sign assumes ‘ + ’ for majority buys and ‘–’ 
for majority sells) up to an idiosyncratic noise term ε.   Thus ,   si =  sign (K ∑
∈
− ε+
iNj
1jts ) .   The factor 
K is inversely related to market depth or the trading volume and Ni  are those investors directly connected  
to the ith. investor.   The relative strengths of the cohesion/imitative parameter K and the variance of  
idiosyncratic term with a critical value for K, defined as Kc, determines whether one way markets  form 
or whether the idiosyncratic noise impedes this.  In the critical state there are equal numbers of buys and 
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though endogenously changing networks have been considered in Mailath et. al. (1997) and 
Jackson and Watts (2002).  The impact of the spatial interconnectedness or the network 
structure on the diffusion dynamics has been analysed on a case by case basis by Goyal and 
Janssen (1996), Chwe (2000) and Morris ( 2000).  The state of the system at each time period is 
the vector of  A’s and B’s adopted by each of the agents who are represented by vertices of the 
graph defining the social network.  The potential of a state is the linear combination of the 
payoffs from the A- region, the B- region and the idiosyncratic component.  Following the Ising 
model and statistical mechanics, the long run relative frequency of each state is given by the 
Gibbs distribution which is concentrated on the states with high potential.  Such states have 
been defined to be stochastically stable by Foster and Young (1990).   
 As already noted, in contrast to the Bak type criticality literature which studies the 
critical state of the system when both A and B coexist, the tipping style Ising models of socio-
economic dynamics have focused on asymptotic stochastic stability analysis.  The bulk of what 
passes as complex systems theory currently is the local interaction models of systems that are 
not capable of producing innovation or ones in which innovations are exogenously introduced.  
The network dynamics for 2-dimensional Ising model and some of its hierarchical extensions 
are fully solvable with many of the economic applications here being fully analytical.  However, 
it is far from the case that in the models surveyed here critical behaviour is self-organized.  It is 
increasingly being understood that the self-organization in a system requires endogenizing the 
scope for competitive coevolutionary dynamics referred to as the Red Queen principle which 
maintains the system at the critical region.  This will be addressed in Section 3.   
 
1.2.3 Self-Organization by evolution of common shared operating schema or institutions 
 
This section grapples with the idea that on the one hand while cooperative behaviour is a strong 
force of self-organization, on the other, as seminally mooted by Axelrod (1984, 1987) 
cooperative behaviour and such societal norms may be an emergent phenomenon rather than 
arising from rational calculation.  It is well known that the two person one shot version of the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma16  leads to a Nash equilibrium outcome that favours the dominant strategy 
to defect rather than to cooperate.  In what Axelrod calls iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (IPD), 
players remember others they previously interact with and also some aspects of the prior 
outcomes.  Axelrod invited a number of game theorists to submit strategies that they believe 
would win the highest scores when playing one another, a pair at a time, in a round robin 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sells, however,  there are large clusters of consensual behaviour with the system being highly susceptible 
to unstable crash type behaviour. 
16 Purists on emergent outcomes would argue that cooperative behaviour at a collective level should be 
shown to arise from agents who have no inherent mechanism for cooperation embodied in them.  In other 
words, what the observer would categorize as cooperative behaviour at a collective level should not be in 
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tournament.  So, Computational Experimental Economics was born. On the face of it, given 
entrenched priors on what one thinks is rational play, the Bayesian strategy with the other 
player’s moves modelled as a Markov process (one of the strategies that was submitted) could 
be thought to be the winner.  Interestingly, the simplest strategy called Tit-For-Tat submitted by 
Anatol Rapoport achieved the highest average score.  In a series of computer simulations of IPD 
where agents learn to play robust responses using genetic algorithms in repeated rounds17, a 
whole new notion of robustness of rules in coevolving populations of strategies was mooted by 
Axelrod.  Recently, N person IPD has been generalized to include spatial topology in the 
interaction of agents, especially in a small-world framework.  In Abramson and Kuperson 
(2001) it was found that when the connective properties were altered from a completely ordered 
lattice to a random network, for fixed payoffs in the game of N- person IPD, the emergent 
behaviours that it sustained were non-trivially different.    
The classic example of the emergence of a common shared operational scheme that then 
coordinates large numbers of decentralized trading agents in economic systems is the emergence 
of money as a medium of exchange.  This is no different from the coordination achieved in 
slime mold composed of constituent cells with none being dictatorial in any way but each 
having the capacity to respond to a common chemical signal, Keller and Segel (1970).   This 
enables the slime mold to self-organize as if as one and ‘walk’ across the forest floor in large 
clusters.  The ‘walking’ is done as a single unit as there is a positive feedback from the larger 
quantities of chemicals emitted from clusters to individuals encouraging the growth of larger 
clusters.       
Carl Menger (1892) had conjectured that a medium of exchange could have emerged 
spontaneously rather then by dictates of the sovereign.  Marimon et. al. (1989) consider a 
trading regime where there is an absence of conditions that permit barter, viz. the double 
coincidence of wants.  Further, in addition to goods that agents produce and consume (each type 
of agent exclusively produces one good that he does not consume and consumes a strict subset 
of others) there is one good that they neither produce or consume, say good 0.  The experiment 
uses artificially intelligent agents who meet randomly and make decisions to trade, consume or 
carry forward goods which are acquired only in the expectation that it may lead to more 
frequent trades in the goods that the agent consumes. Agents use two Classifier Systems with a 
scoring/credit accounting system to select rules for trading and another one for consumption 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the local objective/payoff function at the level of the individual.  An example of this is given  in 
Hemelrijk (1997) where herd behaviour emerges  in aggressive individuals.   
17 Based on evidence in Linster (1992), Binmore (1998) has criticized Axelrod’s claim that Tit-For-Tat or 
strategies ‘similar’ to it dominated the runs in which cooperation emerged in the IPD version with agents 
selecting strategies using genetic algorithms.  Making the notion of strategies that resemble Tit-For-Tat in 
machine code more precise, Tsang et. al  (2003)  show that though the main Axelrod premise that the 
majority of the converged runs shows that cooperation emerges, Tit-For-Tat like strategies only account 
for 20.1% of all strategies and Grim comes in ahead  of all strategies at 24.9%.   
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decisions.  Agents can improve welfare by coordinating on the use of good 0 as a medium of 
exchange.  But, there is no a priori  way of deducing which trading/consumption rules when 
mutually adopted will lead to this.  In the Marimon et. al. (1989) model, over time it was 
discovered  that the artificially intelligent agents with minimal decentralized information and 
aiming only that they increase their utility, inductively (Column III, Table 1) found rules that 
led to good 0 being the common medium of exchange.  
One of the important insights from multi-agent adaptive simulations such as by Ackley 
and Littman (1992) is the inverse relationship between the need for explicit calculation and 
learning and the evolutionary development of system wide well adapted operational schema or 
institutions.  Once the latter are in place agents need to exercise very little intelligence to get 
things ‘right’.   What explicit learning was initially needed when fully adapted becomes instinct 
and atrophied into skilled behaviour.  In the Ackley and Litterman (1992) experiments, agents 
have neural network brains which are capable of being universal function approximators with 
the same powers of calculation as Turing Machines. The apparent bounded behaviour in brain 
activity that is seen after the emergence of shared schema should not therefore lead one to 
conclude that the agents have any ad hoc  bound to their computational intelligence in the first 
place.  
The recent experimental behavioural studies surrounding the variants of double auctions 
show that the market in action can produce easy convergence to competitive market clearing 
prices with very few traders who use a minimum of strategic behaviour or computational 
powers.  In a now celebrated paper, Gode and Sunder (1993) show that continuous double 
auction markets populated by zero intelligent agents are highly efficient in extracting gains from 
trade and price trajectories converge to competitive equilibrium prices.  Zero intelligence 
corresponds to simple computer programs that generate random bids (or asks) subject to a no 
loss constraint.  The latter means that traders cannot buy above their redemption values or sell 
below their costs and no attempt is made to maximize profits. This was sufficient to obtain 98% 
of the gains from trade.  Thus, the best price rule of execution in double auction18 is a simple but 
powerful device to obtain competitive outcomes with the great economies of computation and 
information that Hayek (1945) emphasized.  Sunder (2002) concludes that “a claim that the 
predictions of the first fundamental theorem in economics are approachable in classical 
environments without actual or attempted maximization by participants might have been met 
with scepticism until recently.  Thanks to a largely serendipitous discovery using computer 
simulations of markets, we claim that weak forms for individual rationality, far short of 
                                                          
18 In a double auction a buyer submits a price at which he is willing to buy ( bid) and the seller submits 
the price at which he will sell (ask).  The rule of best price execution states that at any point in time 
execution of trades occurs at the highest bid in the market and the lowest ask.  Those buyers and sellers 
who cannot meet this are put under competitive pressure.   
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maximization, when combined with appropriate market institutions, can be sufficient for the 
market outcomes to approach the predictions of the first welfare theorem” ( italics added).  
 
2. The Computation and Identification of Fixed Point Mappings of Market Equilibria 
 
2.1The computational complexity of Brouwer’s fixed  point and decentralized exchange 
Axtell’s important contribution to this Feature on the prevalence of decentralized exchange is 
to show that it overcomes the problem of computational intractability of the Brouwer’s fixed 
point theorem that underpins Walrasian equilibrium models.  This is in keeping with the 
evolutionary solutions discussed in the previous section that enable us to solve problems that 
may almost surely be beyond methods given in Column I, Table 1.  A problem is 
computationally intractable if it only has exponential time algorithms that have computation 
times that vary exponentially with the problem size (an integer N), for example, rN, for some r 
>1.  A polynomial (P) time algorithm is said to be tractable if its computation time varies 
proportional to the problem size raised to some integer power, d, as in Nd.  Exponential 
functions grow strictly faster than polynomial ones.  The significance of P-class problems is that 
they coincide with those that can be realistically solved by computers and it is held that every 
practical and efficient algorithm can be rendered as a polynomial time bounded Turing machine.  
   In general equilibrium theory of markets ( Arrow and Hahn, 1971) it was thought that 
the burden of proof placed by the invisible hand type argument involved the establishment of a 
formal possibility or an existence result on an equilibrium in a decentralized economy. Here 
individuals motivated by self interest and guided by price signals alone are postulated to enjoy 
consistency of economic plans and Pareto optimal resource allocation.  The fixed point 
theorems of Brouwer and Kakutani that imply generic existence results for equilibrium prices is 
the mathematical tool that gives credence to the Walrasian model of an exchange economy.  
Mathematical problems where a solution is known to exist as in the case of the 
existence results of Kakutani and Brouwer are called function problems(FP). This is in contrast 
to the structure of decision problems where a yes or no answer is sought to whether the problem 
has a solution.  Typically, for function problems more elaborate output than “yes” or “no” is 
required.  Axtell, this issue, uses recent results on the complexity class of  Brouwer type 
function problems for fixed points (see, Papadimitrou ,1994)  which show them to be related to 
that of the parity argument via the Sperner’s Lemma.19  The parity argument arises from a graph 
theoretic lemma that any finite graph has an even number of  odd-degree nodes.  Sperner’s 
Lemma guarantees the existence of a directed graph to the 3-colored triangle identical to the 
larger one, but to date no known polynomial algorithm exists for this.  The analogue to 
                                                          
19 Sperner’s lemma states that any admissible colouring of any triangulation of the unit triangle  has a 3-
coloured triangle,( viz. an odd number of them by the parity argument.).  While a directed graph to the 3-
colored triangle (within the larger triangle) exists, the constructive problem is that there is as yet no 
known polynomial time algorithm for this.  
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Brouwer’s fixed point theorem follows from the generalization of  Sperner’s Lemma  when 
applied to a N-dimensional simplex guarantees the existence of a panchromatic simplex.  The 
Brouwer’s fixed point function f(x*)=x* can be proved to exist at the limit of the center, x*, of 
panchromatic simplices obtained by finer and finer triangulations, Papadimitrou (1994).  Once 
again, due to the above analogue to Sperner’s Lemma, there are no known polynomial 
algorithms for the Brouwer and Kakutani fixed points specifically in the general case of non-
linear utility functions for the Walrasian equilibrium model.  Axtell concludes that the 
exponential (non-polynomial) complexity of the Walrasian fixed point algorithms as opposed to 
polynomial computations involving N, the number of commodities in the economy, may rule 
them out as a plausible computational device for equilibrium price formation in real world 
markets.   
Axtell conjectures that polynomial complexity that is a prerequisite of real world 
equilibrium price formation mechanisms may crucially arise from institutional arrangements 
that promote informational and computational decentralization.  The aggregation of information 
into the net demand functions of the Walrasian model has long been known to be excessive. The 
much quoted observation regarding this being that of  Hayek (1945, italics added) “ We cannot 
expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this information to a central 
board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders …. The problem is to show how a 
solution is produced by interaction of people each of whom has partial knowledge”.   
However, it is not till very recently that it has been recognized that the invisible hand 
type arguments also involves a burden of proof  along the lines of what John Rust (1987) has 
called computational decentralization  that militates against the highly aggregative calculation 
involved in the fixed point algorithm of the Walrasian model.  
   Axtell, this issue, suggests that instead of imputing the locus of equilibrium price 
calculations to reside in an entity such as the Walrasian auctioneer, it is more appropriate to 
consider the decentralized market  as a  whole as a collective computing device.  Axtell then 
proceeds to show that parallel distributed agent based models of k-lateral exchange can restore 
the all important polynomial complexity in calculation of equilibrium prices and allocations.   
 
2.2 Adaptive/Inductive Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria  
A major part of the coordination processes in markets rely on the identification and calculation 
of fixed point mappings of global signals such as equilibrium prices.  By forming rational 
expectations of fixed points of market equilibrium prices economic agents are meant to 
coordinate their activity and iron out inconsistent expectations.  Spear (1989) was the first to 
show that the problem of identifying a set of fixed points for market equilibrium price functions 
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is algorithmically unsolvable.20 The absence of an unique decision procedure or a deductive 
means by which to select  appropriate forecast models/functions has been intuitively justified as 
arising from the self-referential character of the problem by Arthur et. al. (1997) : “the 
expectational  models investors choose affect the price sequence, so that ..their.. very choices of 
models affect their data and so their choices of model.  Arthur et. al. (1997) refer to the above 
self- referential structure of the problem as causing  it to be ill defined.  Likewise, in the El Farol 
game, Arthur (1994) gives the classic prototype of a problem with a contrarian structure for 
which there is no deductive means of arriving at a solution.  The methods of Table 1 Column II 
can precisely show how these problems are well understood to be algorithmically unsolvable.  
Mathematically to solve such problems, methods of inductive inference including that of 
heterogeneous adaptive agents of Column III,Table 1 are required.   
Arifovic (1994) pioneered the first adaptive social learning model of a homogenous 
rational expectations equilibrium using a single population genetic algorithm.  However, in the 
El Farol game of Arthur (1994) where  punters at a popular bar want like to be there on days 
when it is not crowded, the very notion of homogenous rational expectations is inappropriate to 
the problem.  The El Farol game presents a commonplace preference to be in the minority or a 
situation when pay offs are greatest whilst being contrarian.  An example of this is to be a buyer 
(seller) when the majority is selling  (buying).  It is intuitively clear that if all agents share the 
same forecasting model then actions taken by agents which are consistent with the forecast will 
defeat their objective to be in the minority.  The fixed point of such a game involving a 
contrarian structure represents a non-computable fixed point, see Markose ( 2001b, 2002, 
Section 2).   In the absence of computable fixed points,  rational agents even with the same 
information must agree to disagree.  Indeed, in the large literature that has since grown on the 
Minority game (see, Challet and Zhang ,1998)  the self-organized equilibrium that arises in the 
absence of computable homogenous rational expectations is sustained by a critical degree of 
heterogeneity in strategies.  This self organized equilibrium attains greater Pareto improving 
welfare gains than the Nash equilibrium outcome in which agents randomize.21  
 In the Arthur et. al. (1997) agent based stock market model all the standard  
neoclassical features with preferences, constraints and even optimal portfolio choice rules 
                                                          
20 In the computability framework, rational expectations involves an executable meta forecast function 
whose code represents a fixed point of the market clearing price function.   This has been precisely stated 
in Markose (2002, Section 2). 
21 Denoting all N traders as buyers, Nb, or sellers, Ns ,the ‘social’ gains from trade are optimized when 
after some large number of trading periods, T,  the following variance function σ 2 = 
∑
=
−
T
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2
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T
1 is at a minimum.  What is interesting is that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
where agents randomly buy or sell with probability half is not in fact Pareto optimal or the emergent 
outcome.   There is a generic degree of heterogeneity of strategies for any N for which the σ2 function is 
minimized as the agents inductively solve the problem.  In the latter, the minima for σ 2 are below what is 
obtained by the Nash equilibrium random mixed strategies. 
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appear.  The agents are however heterogeneous in their forecast models for asset returns and 
have to use adaptive GAs/GPs of  Table 1, Column III as deductive means do not exist to 
solve such strongly self-referential mappings.  The objectives of the agent based stock market 
experiment were to study the conditions under which homogenous rational expectations of stock 
returns follow and whether the stylized facts of fat tails and volatility clustering can be 
reproduced.  As the market environment is maintained relatively stationary with a low intensity 
of search by GAs or GPs for better trading strategies, the unique homogenous rational 
expectations result followed in Arthur et. al. (1997) accompanied by a cessation of trade as per 
the no trade theorem.  In contrast, when the rate of GA exploration for ‘better’ predictors was 
speeded up, the stock market prices began to show some of the historically observed properties 
of volatility clustering and crashes.  However, as will be pointed out in the next section, in so far 
as the rate of performance enhancement, the timing and extent of retraining of GA/GP agents 
were exogenously altered by the experimenter rather than endogenously determined in terms of 
the Red Queen dynamic, it is difficult to talk about (see, Chen and Yeh, 2001) the self-
organized or emergent nature of market efficiency.   
 
3.Evolution of Complexity And The Red Queen Principle 
 
3.1 The more things change, the more they stay the same   
The Red Queen principle has been espoused by both evolutionary biologists, van Valen (1973) 
and physicists, Anderson (1977) to characterize a relentless arms race type dynamic of change 
among competing elements at a micro level with remarkable macro level stability of the system 
along some dimensions.  Conveying these two aspects of the system dynamic, Anderson in his 
Nobel Prize lecture (1977) said “it is remarkable that in almost all cases interactions play a vital 
role, yet many results are not changed too seriously by them.  ..We have gone to extraordinary 
lengths to make our magnetic moments..or electrons.. to stay in one place  (italics added)… 
This situation was foreshadowed by an eminent 19th. century mathematician named Dodgson,” 
(Ibid p.397).  The latter also known as Lewis Carol has the following passage in his book Alice 
Through the Looking Glass which has  lend itself to the so called Red Queen principle :  “Well 
in our country ” said Alice, still panting a little “you’d generally get to somewhere else if you 
ran very fast for a long time as we been doing.”  “A slow kind of country!” said the Red Queen.  
“Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to be in the same place”. 
In Physics, the Red Queen principle asserts that a continuous application of offsetting or 
contravening force at a micro level can maintain global stability.  In evolutionary biology, the 
rivalrous coevolution of species is seen to be a spur to the evolution of complexity itself, 
manifesting, however, no net gains in relative fitness.  Here, we will be guided by Arthur 
Robson who is among the first to have discussed the Red Queen  principle and its relevance for 
Economics.  Robson represents an economist who has taken serious time out to study the 
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evidence for competitive coevolution in biology to see what implications it may have for the 
growth of complexity in socio-economic institutions and market environments.  He is of the 
view that the Red Queen type competition among species drives the most remarkable of macro 
evolutionary phenomena, viz. the emergence of  innovative forms and more complex organisms. 
Analogous to this in the economic domain is the Schumpeterian model of capitalist growth 
which is characterized by monopolistic firms which develop innovative products involving new 
technology as barriers to entry for competing firms. The static world of  Welfare Theorems of 
perfect competition with fixed preferences and technology – which many  will accept as being 
relevant for local optima – cannot adequately deal with macro evolutionary trends that account 
for movements to global optima and the production of new and more complex forms. Such 
dynamic competition, which Robson thinks is bound to be more important than the precepts of 
static efficiency, still remains outside the ambit of much of standard economic theory.   
As the Red Queen principle is a metaphor for the various ways in which competitive 
coevolution proceeds, it is conceivable that a full assessment of this  principle to account for the 
rampant complexity of many biological and natural systems may remain less than perfect.  In 
the light of vast evidence from evolutionary systems of the growth of complexity, Robson  in 
his masterful survey, this issue, concludes that it is striking that  much of extant game theory 
and economic literature in general overlooks the Red Queen principle and appears to labour 
under an erroneous view that there is no such arms race in complexity.  There is not only little 
evidence that evolutionary systems select against complexity, as we will see, there are 
compelling reasons why an arms race in complexity is inevitable among intelligent agents.           
In the Red Queen effects associated with the notion of coevolving populations of 
species, the furious pace of “running” relates to each species attempting to enhance their fitness 
relative to others.  In the competition that governs the fight for scarce resources or in cases of 
direct confrontation with zero sum payoffs such as in parasite-host or predator-prey situations 
what matters is relative rather than absolute performance capabilities of the individuals.  Certain 
attributes of individuals have to be enhanced relative to the same in others to maintain status 
quo, let alone to get ahead of the game.  As with one, others are like wise involved in 
performance enhancement: triggering off an arms race.  Since only hypothesis and conjectures 
but not direct tests of the Red Queen principle can be applied to evolutionary biology, Artificial 
Life simulations have become the means to understand the system dynamics and the distinctive 
features of competitive coevolution.  The classic work of Ray’s Tierra (1990) and Sim’s 
creatures (1994) are based on the principle of competing coevolving species.  In Hillis (1990) 
parasites were deliberately introduced and it was noted that competition among coevolving 
species could potentially prevent stagnation at local optima. Robson, this issue, gives an 
analytical example of how this might be the case.  The evolution of intelligence itself is 
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hypothesized to arise as an arms race giving rise to Machiavellian behaviour in social 
interactions within the same species, Robson (2002).   
Robson,  this issue, also gives a detailed account of how heterosexual sex which is 
instrumental in giving ample variation to genetic material of the species can be interpreted as a 
Red Queen type response to evade parasitic behaviour of microorganisms that can themselves 
mutate and resist antigens produced by host species.    
3.1 Some Economic Examples of Red Queen Effects 
What significance might the Red Queen principle have for Economics ? 
The Red Queen effect can manifest in the arms race of product innovation among firms in 
capitalist systems, simply for them to maintain status quo in market shares.   In recent extensive 
work on a cross section of industries done by John Sutton, he finds strong evidence for this form 
of  non-price competition.  In the case of a number industries or product categories where the 
leading firms were locked in a prolonged arms race of product innovation, market shares were 
remarkably stable, viz. rival firms’ efforts offset each other.  Innovating firm’s products are 
either imitated by the rival firms or countered by their own innovations.  However, there are 
also examples of rivalrous product innovation where the brand leaders are over taken and 
market shares are volatile. Failure to respond quickly enough to the competition is held up as 
the reason for the erosion of market share.  Figure 2a gives evidence from the margarine 
industry where though scores of new varieties of margarine differing in texture, flavour and 
hardness were introduced by the firms, their market shares remain more or less unchanged. 22In 
the case of cash registers, Figure 2b, where arguably the scope for technological change and 
                                                          
22 I’m grateful to John Sutton for letting me use his findings and graphs here.  
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product innovation is vastly greater than for margarine, the market shares were highly volatile.  
For our purposes here either outcome is in keeping with the Red Queen principle in that players 
cannot maintain status quo along a critical dimension unless they can keep up with their peers.  
The interesting question is what global properties a system would exhibit if agents in it were 
relentlessly trying to ‘keep up’ Red Queen style.  
In financial markets, enormous investment in innovative investment strategies is made 
to keep up and surpass the average performance of the market as a whole. In Markose  et. 
al.(2003) the so called Red Queen constraint is endogenously imposed on the forecast and 
trading performance of a multi population GP agent stock market environment. The premise 
here is that when all speculative investors are constrained to ‘beat’ the market, there comes a 
point of market equilibrium when it is impossible for any one to do so.  Market efficiency is an 
emergent or unintended consequence with the power law  properties of investment income 
distribution and stock prices that satisfy the stylized facts of fat tails in asset returns.     
Red Queen effects also appear in the arena of regulatory arbitrage resulting in arms race 
in regulatory tightening and creative evasion by regulatees.  A plethora of recent institutions 
(see, Miller,1986) have arisen when regulatees who find it profitable to break  regulatory 
structures do so by exiting and innovating new institutions that place them beyond the long arm 
of the law.  The notion that surprises or innovations should be used strategically as best 
response because anticipated policy may be contravened by innovative regulatees has a long 
tradition in macro economics literature, Lucas ( 1972).  The next section will briefly discuss the 
significance of Lucas’s seminal insights on why the structure of opposition such as between 
regulators and regulatees with agents capable of anticipating the outcomes of others’ strategies 
generates innovative structure changing Type IV dynamics.     
 
3.3 The ubiquitous structure of opposition and strategic innovation 
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Innovation is clearly war by other means in market systems, evolutionary biology and 
immunology which involve oppositional zero sum parasite-host type rivalrous relationships.  Ho 
and Saunders (1986) and more recently Kauffman (1993) have criticized the inadequacy of the 
Darwinian view that new forms are but a conglomeration of random variations accumulated by 
natural selection and preserved by heredity. In extant game theory whether eductive or 
evolutionary there is no notion of innovation being a Nash equilibrium strategy  let alone one 
that is necessitated as a best response by a structure of opposition.  As in traditional Darwinian 
evolution, in economic models innovation is either introduced at a random rate or as an ad hoc 
addition in the form of trend growth.  
The missing piece has been the dynamic behind the emergence of variety in new forms.  
The Red Queen type rivalrous coevolution accounts for a contextual and strategic explanation 
for species being finely honed to the characteristics of other rival species.  Recent empirical 
research on RNA virus which are considered to be the most important group of intracellular 
parasites has led  researchers to hypothesize the notions of hyper-mutability and that of a 
‘mutator phenotype’.  The latter is a behaviour whereby high rates of mutation are adopted with 
the RNA virus maintaining a highly heterogeneous population called a quasi species which 
generate new escape mutants that can avoid detection from the immune system.  In other words, 
mutation rates are strategically induced rather than arising randomly and this endogenously 
determined dynamic sustains self-organization in the critical region.23                       
The Red Queen principle on having to run faster and faster to survive in the face of 
rivals, therefore, offers two outward manifestations of an arms race :  
(1)In performance capabilities which can come in the form of enhancement of some existing 
faculty in the species such as intelligence, sensory faculties , speed of locomotion etc. 
 and/or  
(2) In the use of novelty or surprises viz. the explicit production of new forms.   
The ubiquitous structure of opposition envisaged in the Red Queen alone cannot suffice 
for the emergence of novelty or new features.  As noted previously, it has long been conjectured 
by Wolfram (1984)  that it takes agents with the highest powers of computational intelligence 
that resides in Turing machines and enables them to make simulations of computations made by 
other agents to produce innovation based structure changing dynamics.  Wolfram has conducted 
extensive computer simulations to test his major hypothesis that computational universality is 
more generic than hitherto assumed and can arise in simple cellular automata (see, footnote 9).  
Bio-chemical or some other means by which agents can making self referential calculations of 
hostile behaviour of other agents is the trigger  for  strategic innovation envisaged  in these 
                                                          
23 The RNA virus is able to maintain a critical level of heterogeneity in the quasi species with their 
mutation rates being possible up to the point at which genetic coherence and heredity break down, Sole′ 
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contexts are a far cry from random mutations that have so far been held to be the only means for 
the emergence of new forms or ‘objects’.   As yet, it is not fully understood how the immune 
system biochemically detects hostile agents (see, Holland, 1992).  Markose ( 2001b, 2002, 
Section 3) uses the epochal Gödel (1931) incompleteness result to show that the conditions of 
opposition  between two Turing machines and for  these machines to mutually recognize this 
structure are logically necessary for  innovative outcomes that have an encoding that is beyond 
algorithmic enumeration. Gödel (1931) had seminally used the notion of the Liar, the agent who 
falsifies or controverts, to embody the pure logic of opposition.  However, the Liar can falsify 
with certainty only from a computable fixed point.  This is intuitively well understood in the 
Lucasian thesis on policy ineffectiveness that regulatees can contravene policy only if the policy 
outcomes can be rationally expected.  When there is mutual recognition of the players of the 
structure of opposition, the so called fixed point with the Liar can be fully deduced to be a non-
computable fixed point.  Any total computable function from this non-computable fixed point 
referred to as the productive function in Emil Post’s set theoretic proof of Gödel incompleteness 
and as shown in Markose (2001b) to represent the best response function,  can only map into a 
set that cannot be algorithmically enumerated.  This coincides with the notion of the strategic 
use of surprise as intuitively proposed by Lucas (1972). The corresponding equilibrium Type 
IV dynamics converges to the non-computable domain between recursively inseparable sets is 
encapsulated in the famous thesis of  Langton (1992) on “life at the edge of chaos” and has been 
set out in Figure 1.  The undecidable dynamics implies the logical impossiblility of meta 
(econometric) models to recursively identify the innovation induced structure change – a matter 
once again that has been raised in the Lucas Critique (1976).        
 It was not till the seminal work of Binmore (1987) that game theory even considered 
the major implications for dynamical systems, as yet not fully understood by economists, of 
incorporating agents with computational universality and the Gödelian logic involving the Liar 
or the rule breaker.24  A Nash equilibrium in which agents innovate as a best response to evade 
hostile objectives of other agents and produce novel objects not previously in action sets is 
currently outside the ambit of traditional game theory.  The latter, without the scope of the 
mathematics of incompleteness, can only consider randomization and not innovation in zero 
sum and oppositional situations.   Markose (2001b) shows that it is indeed the Gödelian logic, 
the capacity for self-referential calculations by an agent of hostile behaviour of other agents, 
with the ubiquitous structure of opposition formalized in the Liar, that constitute the necessary 
                                                                                                                                                                          
et. al. (1997).  At the latter point the immune system wins and a heterogeneous environment for the RNA 
ceases to exist.   
24 It is my view that it is such irrevocably non-computable structures in strategic situations that Simon 
(1998) calls the “out guessing problem ” which makes  the “whole concept of rationality ill-
defined..”..and .. . “we must adopt some different framework (outside extant game theory) to explain 
behaviour under these conditions” (ibid. p.188).  
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conditions to trigger innovative behaviour with secrecy and subterfuge as being part and parcel 
of the rational Nash equilibrium strategy at this juncture.  In Ray’s classic artificial life 
simulation called Tierra, Ray (1992), in a Red Queen like arms race, when some agents perceive 
that others are parasitic on them, they start hiding their whereabouts and also mutate to evade 
the parasite.    
 
4. Empirical Economics, Power Laws and Other ‘Stylized’ CAS Facts 
 
4.1The identification problem  
As rightly pointed out by Durluaf , this issue, many of the precursors in the economics literature 
on CAS, both in the area of economic history and social interaction models have eschewed any 
explicit connection to complex systems theory  either in terms of  von Neumann’s grand 
computational foundations or some subset of it as espoused by econo physicists.  Nevertheless, 
we are particularly indebted to eminent economic historians, institutional and evolutionary 
economists from Hayek, North to Nelson and Winter to wean us off a mathematical economics 
that is a far cry from the real world complexity.    
Despite claims of universality of  certain statistical properties of CAS outcomes, in so 
far as self-organization formally requires non-computability of specific end-states, patterns and 
equilibria, the significance of the system running its course or path dependent outcomes comes 
to the forefront.  Economic historians and  evolutionary economists such as Nelson and Winter 
(2002, gives a recent overview) have often used their historical case study approach to 
underscore the point that the problem of path dependence makes the study of processes involved 
of interest in contrast to end state asymptotic analysis and static efficiency results of 
neoclassical analysis.  Barring Type I and Type II dynamics, the lack of independence from 
initial conditions and the relevance of the specific time path of processes have to be presumed.  
 Durlauf bravely tackles the historical accounts on the QWERTY keyboard to address 
the conceptual issues surrounding path dependence such as whether technological  lock-ins  are 
inefficient equilibria or are in fact efficient ones given network effects, fixed costs and so on.  It 
has been argued by Axtell et. al.  (2000) on the emergence of equity norms and other path 
dependent outcomes, that agent models are needed to show in an experimental set up how 
depending on initial conditions, social systems can manifest meta stable states of inefficient and 
inequitable social norms that are observed in many societies.  A meta stable state is one in 
which a system spends a very long period of time in terms of intermediate time scales and 
typically such behaviour of the system cannot be analytically determined, even if as in Axtell et. 
al. (2000) the asymptotic stochastically stable outcome can be determined a priori.    
The bulk of Durlauf’s thought provoking contribution on the extant empirical work on 
complexity in economics surrounds what he calls the identification problem.  Inefficient 
equilibria as he notes can arise from coordination failure as much as from maladaptive lock ins.  
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Further, there appears to be no consensus as yet as to what causes power law distributions which 
have been held up as a manifestation of self-organized critical behaviour.    
4.2 Endogenous Economic Explanations of Power Law 
In many econo physics models, power laws as a stylized CAS fact arising from self-organized 
criticality, as we saw in previous sections, fall far short of a demonstration of self-organization.  
This is because the agency for innovation in the system is external to it.   Durlauf  also raises the 
problem of the absence of endogenous economically sensible explanations in some econo 
physics models.  However, as already noted even agent based stock market models that have 
what many would consider to be all the sensible features of neoclassical models, requires 
external tuning to bring about asset price dynamics that correspond to observed stylized facts to 
do with fat tails and volatility clustering.  The latter are anomalous with the standard Guassian 
assumptions25 on stock returns and neoclassical models on homogenous rational expectations 
and no trade theorems.    
 Lux (2000,2002) has expended much effort to ascertain the tail index of asset returns in 
a number of markets.  In these studies, Lux finds that values for the tail index for asset returns 
lies between 2.5 and 4 guaranteeing at least finite first and second moments for the processes.  
As the latter rule out Levy Stable distributions for asset returns first conjectured by Mandelbroit 
(1966) and with the statistical rejection of null hypothesis of  Guassian/normality for stock 
returns,  it is still an open question as to what class of statistical processes asset returns belong 
to.  Further, there is a large body of  alleged evidence for persistence or long memory 
observable as the hyperbolic decay of the auto correlation function of volatility of asset returns 
(the absolute or the square of asset returns) (see, Ding et. al.,1993, Breidt et. al., 1998).   Lux 
and Simone(2003) put agent stock market models to good use by finding, after painstaking 
investigation, that the popular herding framework of  Kirman and Teyssiére (2002) which has 
previously been upheld as an ‘explanation’ for long memory in asset volatility can only be a 
spurious result.  This is because analytically, the structure of the herding model with two groups 
of agents, fundamentalists and chartists, follows a bounded Markovian process with a bimodal 
limiting distribution and “any memory in the system is wiped out by stochastic fluctuations 
between the two modes of the distribution” (ibid).   Nevertheless, standard statistical tests for 
long memory, when applied to simulated data from this class of agent models, erroneously 
support the hypothesis for power law decay in the autocorrelation function of the volatility of 
asset returns.  Likewise,  Durlauf , this issue, lists a number of shortcomings in the statistical 
tests of power and scaling laws so far conducted in the literature on markets as CAS.     
                                                          
25Stock market crashes and other not so extreme events seen in asset markets are anomalous to the 
Gaussian model of asset returns.  In the latter, the 1987 stock market crash with a 22.6% percent fall in 
the stock returns in one day is an event that is so improbable that it cannot happen even in the lifetime of 
the universe, see Sornette (2003, p.50).  
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 A number of econo physicists such as Sornette (1998), Lux and Sornette (2003), Levy 
and Solomon (1996), Solomon(1998), based on earlier work by Keston (1973) and Goldie 
(1991),  have identified stochastic multiplicative processes26 with non-linear lower bound 
constraints  as being contributory  to power law distributions in certain economic models.  In the 
Levy and Solomon (1996) artificial stock market model, this lower bound constraint appears for 
each agent as a condition that his wealth does not fall below the average investor wealth.  
Milakovic (2001) in a  survey on endogenous explanations for the power law exponent close to 
3/2 in wealth distribution claims that the condition for power law distribution in the Levy and 
Solomon (1996) model “depends on an arbitrarily imposed lower bound ”constraint on 
individual agent’s wealth defined as a function of the mean wealth of the population.  Following 
recent developments on the Red Queen principle reported in Section 3,  Markose et. al.(2003) 
have argued that this is far from an arbitrary constraint.  It can in fact be viewed as the so called 
Red Queen constraint.   The satisfaction of this lower bound constraint is modelled in Markose 
et. al. (2003) as a behavioural one that arises endogenously from coevolving stock market 
agents.  It then  dictates performance enhancement in adaptive learning of investment strategies 
that will enable agents to ‘keep up’ with the market Red Queen style. It has been analytically 
shown by Solomon (1998) that if no attempt is made by those who fail to keep up, then the 
crucial power law exponent α on wealth distribution (see footnote 12) can fall below 1, 
signalling a highly inegalitarian wealth distribution.  Conversely, if ‘too much’ effort is put into 
keeping up, then  the  α power law exponent will exceed 2, which manifests a more egalitarian 
wealth distribution than can be warranted by the historically observed  α ~ 3/2.  We have seen 
that in artificial stock market models in which agents have to individually learn and adapt in a 
multi population GP environment, retraining of GPs is mostly done in an ad hoc way.  When 
the Red Queen constraint was explicitly set up in a multi-population form of constraint 
enhanced GPs  who are the agent/investors in an artificial stock market,  Markose et. al. (2003) 
find some evidence on how the crucial α ~ 3/2 can emerge in investor wealth distribution.  
When the Red Queen constraints are not imposed in the artificial stock market, the power law 
exponent on investor wealth diverge markedly from the required α ~ 3/2.   However, these 
results are preliminary and it is far from conclusive whether what one might consider to be CAS 
type agent based features can endogenously in a behavioural sense explain the regularities in the 
global data. 
  
4.3 Econometric models of surprises in policy games and the Lucas Critique 
                                                          
26 A stochastic multiplicative process  is one where   x(t+1)  = λ x(t), with λ random, even time varying 
with finite support.   
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 One of the major themes of the computational legacy of CAS as discussed in Sections 3.3  is 
that the two Lucas (1972) postulates on policy ineffectiveness, the strategic use of surprises and 
the so called Lucas Critique, Lucas (1976), are stylized CAS facts of fundamental significance.  
In the extant policy design literature, the nexus between predictable policy leading to 
policy/institutional failure and the role of surprise strategies is confined to highly stylised macro 
economic models on monetary neutrality and surprise inflation. 27 Remarkably, though macro-
economists in the last three decades made the notion of ‘surprise’ strategies common currency, 
at no time was it regarded  necessary to establish a generic class of  (policy) games where 
‘surprise’ strategies hold in a Nash equilibrium in accordance with the first Lucasian postulate 
on why policy is rendered ineffective.  Hence, the generic necessity of the strategic use of 
indeterminism due to the presence of hostile agents has not been recognized in the macro policy 
literature.28 Further, the indeterminacy of optimal behavioural structures raised in the problem 
of lack of structural invariance in the Lucas Critique is regarded to be unrelated to the first two 
Lucasian postulates. 
Some of the econometric issues relating to the Lucas Critique were recently reviewed in 
Hoover (1995).  Indeed, many (see, Ericsson et. al. ,1995, 1996) hold that the applicability of 
the Lucas Critique on the lack of structural invariance is an  empirical question, refutable by the 
presence of invariance in the system.29 Thus, it is  not  far off the mark to say that it has not been 
recognized that theory, in particular, CAS theory can throw light on this endogenously arising 
innovative behaviour of agents as best response strategies in rivalrous oppositional structures 
which then lead to Type IV undecidable dynamics of Figure 1.  
  With no theoretical guidance as to which class of games warrant elimination of extant 
policy rules/institutions and the adoption of innovative or surprise strategies in the Nash 
equilibrium signalling structural breaks in the system and therefore to predictive failure with 
meta forecast models, Ericsson and Irons (1995) found “exactly zero papers (that yield) 
empirical support for the Lucas Critique” after an extensive survey of the empirical literature, 
                                                          
27The notion of a surprise strategy in the economics literature appears in the so called Lucas surprise 
supply function often defined as follows: y  = y
* + b( π - π e  ) + ε .  This says that output, y, will not 
increase beyond the natural rate, y*, unless there is ‘surprise’ inflation, (π - π e) which is the white noise 
prediction error from expected inflation, π e.  The idea here is that the private sector contravenes the 
effects of anticipated inflation, viz. the neutrality result.  Hence, it is intuitively asserted that authorities 
who seek to expand output beyond the natural rate need to use surprise inflation.    
28 The attempts by macro policy theorists to eliminate ‘surprise’ inflation and indeterminism by using a 
transparent precommitment strategy in the form of the currency peg led to some of the worst  policy 
disasters with the serial collapse of pegged systems in the last decade,  Eichengreen (1999).   Soros ( 
1995) allegedly claimed that he used the Liar strategy to profit from the collapse of the British currency 
peg in the summer of 1992.  None in the macro economics fraternity saw the relevance of  Binmore 
(1987) who raised the spectre of Gödel and hence the significance of the allusion to the Liar / hostile 
agent who will bring about the demise of institutions that are based on  strategies that have predictable 
outcomes.       
29 I’m grateful to L.Ellis from the Reserve Bank of Australia for bringing this to my attention.   
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Leeper (1985,p.314).  Finally, it must be noted, adaptive agent models of Column III, Table I 
are methodologically better suited to study  unintended consequences of  changes in policy rules 
as they are designed to manifest coevolution and do not run into the Lucas Critique of 
econometric models.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Following the von Neumann computational legacy on CAS which is based on mathematical 
advances in the areas of effective computation or procedures,  incompleteness  and dynamical 
systems theory,  the major hypothesis emanating from Wolfram (1984), Langton (1990, 1992), 
Kaufmann (1993) and  Casti (1994) is that the sine qua non  of complex adaptive systems is 
their capacity to produce novelty or ‘surprises’ and the so called Type IV innovation based 
structure changing dynamics of  the Wolfram-Chomsky schema.  Despite the deep mathematical 
foundations of CAS, remarkably, systems capable of adaptive novelty are commonplace and 
only involve the intuitively familiar notion on the need to evade hostile agents.  Axelrod  (1987) 
in his classic study on cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour in governing design 
principles behind evolution raised the crucial question on the necessity of hostile agents :“ we 
can begin asking about whether parasites are inherent to all complex systems, or merely the 
outcome of the way biological systems have happened to evolve” (ibid. p. 41).   Based on the 
Gödel (1931) incompleteness result, in addition to the formal structure of opposition as being a 
logically necessary condition for evasive and innovative behaviour, Wolfram (1984) had 
conjectured that the highest level of computational intelligence, the capacity for self-referential 
calculation of hostile behaviour was also necessary.  The role of economists in the multi 
disciplinary edifice of CAS, especially their contribution to the crucial insights and ingredients 
of CAS theory on the strategic use of surprises and indeterminacy as part of successful 
evolutionary design principles- is not insubstantial.   
Mathematically, problems involving strongly self-referential global/ system wide 
mappings or those that involve coevolutionary contrarian or hostile agents make these 
impossible to be solved by deductive means of Column I, Table 1.  Adaptive/evolutionary  
methods of Column III, Table 1 have to be used and models beyond optimization and the 
rational economic man of neoclassical economics are needed .  The algorithmic unsolvability of 
the fixed point mappings of  equilibria with adaptive novelty in the Gödelian structure (see, 
Figure 1),  makes self-organization the flip side of  CAS and is perhaps the unifying principle 
for all complex systems.  It is increasingly being understood, as explained in  Sections 1.2.1 and 
3.3, that the seminal Bak notion of self-organized  critical systems with large numbers of 
interacting constituent parts that sustain a critical degree of variety or heterogeneity, requires an 
endogenous dynamic currently being referred to as the Red Queen principle.  The latter can be 
viewed to govern the rate of performance enhancement and the rate of innovative activity 
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among coevolving competitive agents.  There is however, no consensus as to whether it is the 
Red Queen principle and/or some other endogenous causal factor such as the diffusion of 
information in networked systems that gives rise to the power laws associated with SOC 
systems.  Indeed, as we have noted, many socio dynamic models have eschewed any CAS 
lineage as we have yet to fully understand the notion of self-organization with a critical degree 
of heterogeneity to supplant homogeneity and also the universality principles on the network 
connectivity in agents to maintain criticality. 
 The new computational CAS paradigm clearly surpasses the traditional evolutionary 
Darwinian framework of random mutation, heredity and natural selection.  The principles of 
self-organization outlined in this overview go well beyond the Darwinian ideas of natural 
selection currently operationalized in replicator dynamics.  Crucially, the formal results that 
agents with the highest level of  computational intelligence are needed to produce adaptive 
novelty with empirical evidence of the Red Queen dynamic in immunology, in product 
innovation and regulatory arbitrage in the capitalist system, has cast doubt on random mutation 
as being the only source of variety.  The equilibrium with self-organized complexity with 
adaptive novelty of Figure 1 has the highest degree of algorithmic unsolvability of the Hilbert 
Tenth problem.  This model of indeterminism is a far cry from extant models that appear to 
assume adaptive innovation or strategic ‘surprise’ (see, footnote 27) as white noise which in the 
framework of entropy represents perfect disorder, the antithesis of self-organized complexity.   
It can be conjectured that a lack of progress in our understanding of market incompleteness and 
arbitrage free institutions is related to these issues on indeterminism.              
 This Feature on markets as CAS has been critical of some multi-disciplinary 
perspectives of complex systems theory to Economics.  It is also original in highlighting the 
computational foundations of CAS theory and the significance of the Red Queen dynamic in the 
shaping of  macro evolutionary trends and in the process of self-organization that governs the 
critical degree of variety or heterogeneity in  systems. In conclusion, methodologically the view 
of CAS as a novelty producing system with attendant problems of incompleteness spells a 
paradigm shift for many mainstream economists who have operated under the assumption of 
closure and completeness.  
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